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Summary and computer operating systems. Reactive systems are
often naturally modeled (for logical design purposes) as a
A reactive program is one which engages in an ongoing composition of autonomous processes which progress
interaction with its environment. A system which is concurrently and which communicate to share informa-
° controlled by an embedded reactive program is called a tion and/or to coordinate activities. Reactive systems are
reactive system. Examples of reactive systems are aircraft nondeterministic in that the sequence of events is not
flight management systems, bank automatic teller specified but depends on actions of the environment.
' machine (ATM) networks, airline reservation systems Reactive system specifications often include response
and computer operating systems. Reactive systems are time requirements.
often naturally modeled (for logical design purposes) as a
composition of autonomous processes which progress These reactive system process characteristics (autono-
concurrently and which communicate to share mous, concurrent, communicating, nondeterministic, and
information and/or to coordinate activities, time sensitive) have forced the development of new
approaches to verify that a reactive system satisfies its
Formal (i.e., mathematical) frameworks for system specification. As noted by Alur (ref. 3), "The number of
verification are tools used to increase the users' confi- formalisms that purportedly facilitate the modeling,
dence that a system design satisfies its specification. A specifying and proving of timing properties for reactive
framework for reactive system verification includes systems has exploded over the past few years." The
formal languages for system modeling and for behavior diversity of process communication and coordination
specification and decision procedures and/or proof- constructs and the variety of specifications of interest
systems for verifying that the system model satisfies the have contributed to this profusion of frameworks. The
system specifications, features required to further improve next-generation
In the study reported here, using the Ostroff framework frameworks can best be determined through use and
for reactive system verification, an approach to achieving evaluation of currently available frameworks in many
fault-tolerant communication between transputers was diverse applications. One objective for this report is to
shown to be effective. The key components of the design, contribute to that evolutionary process.
the decoupler processes, may be viewed as discrete-event- The framework chosen for the analysis of a particular
controllers introduced to constrain system behavior such system must allow faithful modeling of essential system
that system specifications are satisfied, features in order to reliably infer system behavior from
The Ostroff framework was also effective. The expres- model behavior. In the study reported here, a framework
siveness of the modeling language permitted construction developed by Ostroff was applied to verify an approach to
of a faithful model of the transputer network. The relevant achieve fault-tolerant transputer communication. In the
specifications were readily expressed in the specification following sections, we outline the Ostroff framework,
language. The set of decision procedures provided was review the approach to fault-tolerant transputer communi-
adequate to verify the specifications of interest, cation verified, describe the Transputer Network Model,
and discuss verification procedures and verification
The need for improved support for system behavior results. The need for improved support for system
visualization is emphasized, behavior visualization is emphasized.
Introduction The Ostroff Framework
Computer programs can be classified as either trans- Formal (i.e., mathematical) frameworks for system
formational or reactive. Transformational programs, the verification are tools used to increase the users'
more common type, are typically designed to transform confidence that a system design satisfies its specification.
data via appropriate algorithms and to then output the A framework for reactive system verification includes
results of the computation and terminate. First Order formal languages for system modeling and for behavior
q Logic (ref. 1) is routinely used to specify and to reason specification and decision procedures and/or proof-
about the correctness of transformational programs. A systems for verifying that the system model satisfies the
reactive program is one that engages in an ongoing system specifications. Ostroff's book (ref. 4) should be
interaction with its environment (ref. 2). A system that is consulted for a comprehensive description of the
controlled by an embedded reactive program is called a framework used in this study (hereinafter referred to as
reactive system. Examples of reactive systems are aircraft the Framework). The description here is informal and
flight management systems, bank automatic teller necessarily incomplete.
machine (ATM) networks, airline reservation systems,
A system is modeled as a composition of autonomous, The meaning of the transition label "than ! expr" is: if
concurrent, communicating processes. Each process is this transition is taken, then the value of the expression
represented by a diagram. The elements of the diagram "expr" will be sent on channel "chan." The meaning of
are nodes and labeled, directed edges which connect the transition label "chart ? y" is: if this transition is
nodes and which model process transitions. For each taken, then the value received on channel "chan" will
process an activity or control variable, Av, is defined be assigned to the variable "y." Communication is
which ranges over the process nodes to indicate the synchronous, i.e., enabled only if matching (same
location of control in the process, channel) transitions in both sending and receiving
processes are simultaneously enabled. The first process to
We next review two types of transition which will be reach a send or receive transition will block, i.e., suspend
needed tOmodel the transputer network. An assignment activity, until the matching transition is also enabled. If an
transition is illustrated in figure 1. enabled communication transition is taken, the variable
The transition "cis enabled if control is at as (Av = as) and assignment described is made and then both processes
if guard evaluates to TRUE. Enabled transitions are held continue independently.
for at least lower ticks of the external (conceptual) clock
and must occur no later then upper ticks of the clock. If A system behavior is a sequence of states wherein theinitial state satisfies an initial condition specification and
the enabled transition x is taken, then Av will be assigned where following states are reached by taking an enabled
the value ad and the variables Yl..... Ynwill be assigned transition in any component process. When transitions in
the values of the expressions e 1.....en, respectively. If a
guard is missing, it is assumed to be TRUE. If the list of a number of processes are enabled, the next transition
taken is chosen nondeterministically. (The failure con-
variables is missing, then no variables are assigned values dition in which none of the component processes canby the transition. If the time bounds are missing, they are
assumed to be (lower:.0, upper: infinity), i.e., the progress because all transitions are disabled is called
transition is neither held nor forced, deadlock.) A system is said to satisfy a specification if all
possible system behaviors satisfy the specification. The
Processes communicate via named channels in order to Framework specification language and decision
either transfer information or coordinate activities. A procedures are described in a later section.
synchronous communication transition is illustrated in
figure 2.
guard ---> x [Yl : el, ..- Yn : en] : (lower, upper)
as ad
as sourcenode Yl, .-.Yn variables
ad destinationode e1,... en expressions
x transitionlabel lower lowertimebound
guard booleanexpression upper uppertimebound
Figure1.Assignmenttransitionsyntax.
Sending Receivng
ProcessTransition ProcessTransition
• guard s --_ chan ! expr guardr ----chan ? y
• _0 • PO
, si sj rm rn
guards, guardr booleanexpressions ! sendingprocessidentifier
si, rm sourcenodes ? receivingprocessidentifier
sj, rn destinationodes expr expression
chan communicationchannel y processvariable
Figure2.Synchronouscommunicationtransitionsyntax.
Fault-Tolerant Transputer Communication The key feature of thedesign is that two concurrent
decoupler processes(DECOUPLER1 andDECOUPLER
A transputeris a verylarge scale integration(VLSI) 2) are definedon Transputer1, each of which communi-
device which combineson a single silicon chip--a careswith PRODUCERover two internal channels and
processor,memory for programstorage,hardware-timers, with CONSUMERovera physical channel.(Internal
andcommunicationcontrollerswhich permitdirect channels,used to communicatebetween processes
synchronouscommunicationwith othertransputers on the same transputer,are implementedin software.)
(ref.5). Networksof transputershave beenused to DECOUPLER1continuouslyloops through a sequence
implementa wide varietyof reactivesystems including of three synchronouscommunications:
systemsfor (a) robotguidanceandcontrol(ref. 6),
(b) piloted-helicoptersimulation(ref. 7), and(c) signal 1. Inputdataon internalchannelout1 from
processing(ref. 8). Approachesto achieve fault-tolerant PRODUCER
communicationbetween transputerswere investigatedin 2. Outputdataon physical channelsend1 to
connection with a proposedaircraftapplication.Recall CONSUMER
from the discussionof synchronous communicationthat
aprocess which is ready-to-send will block until the 3. Signal PRODUCERon internalchannelstatus1
matchingprocess is ready-to-receive. If there is only a DECOUPLER2 continuouslyloops through a similar
single physical channelbetween two transputersandthat
sequenceof three synchronous communicationsusing
channel fails, then a process will block if it attemptsto channelsout2, send2, and status2. When bothphysical
send on the failedchannel. A systemthat dependson channelsare operational,PRODUCER sends all infor-
timely communicationover the failedchannelwill fail. mationto CONSUMERoverbothphysical channels.If
Onecannotachieve fault-tolerantcommunication physical channelsend1 fails, then DECOUPLER1will
between processes on different transputers by simply block when it next attempts to use sendl. However,
connecting a second physical channel directly between PRODUCER will detect (infer) that DECOUPLER 1is
the processes and routinely sending all data over both blocked if the signal on statusl is not received within a
channels. The sending process will block when it attempts prespecified time. Thereafter, PRODUCER will continue
to send on afailed channel even though the other channel to communicate over the intact physical channel. The
is fully functional. An approach which does (as will be decoupler processes are effectively discrete-event-
shown) provide fault-tolerant communication between a controllers introduced to constrain system behavior such
process PRODUCER executing on one transputer and a that system specifications are satisfied.
process CONSUMER executing on another is outlined in
figure 3.
Transputer#1 I Transputer#2
I
' "LDec°uplerlJIusl '
Producer 1 Consumer ] '
out2 __send2
Decoupler 2 ] I
I
Figure3. SketchillustratingtheconcurrentprocessesPRODUCER,DECOUPLER1,DECOUPLER2 andCONSUMER
and thecommunicationchannels(out1, out,?.,send1, send2,status1,status2)connectingtheprocesses.Thedecoupler
processesare effectivelydiscrete-event-controllersintroducedtoensurethatcommunicationbetweenPRODUCERand
CONSUMERis notdisruptedby failureof externalchannelsend1or send2.
The Transputer Network Model of the communicatingprocesses which typically include
complex computationsandcommunicationwith other
OCCAM is the nameof a concurrentprogramming transputersoverother channels.
languageused to programtransputersandtransputer
networks(ref.9). To verify the approachto fault-tolerant
transputercommunicationoutlined above, an OCCAM Simplify Data Structures
implementationof the approachwas firsttranslatedinto OCCAMchannelprotocol declarationspermitcommuni-
the Frameworkdiagramlanguagerepresentationshown in cationof complex data structures.Data structuredetails
figure 4. A faithful translationwaspossible becauseboth are irrelevant when verifying OCCAM-Ievel process
languages view systems as a composition of autonomous, communication logic because autonomous, lower-level
concurrent, communicating processesand each (3(2CAM controllers manage the physical data transfer. In figure 4,
construct was expressible in the diagram language. In each communication transfers a single integer.
particular, the semantics of the synchronous communica-
tion construct in each language was identical.
Project Behavior Using Logical Variables
The maximumsize of the composite-systemstate space
is an exponentialfunctionof the numberof processes. An essential aspect of the designis the fact that,unlike a
Therefore, when attemptingverification, it is important sending process which blocks untila matchingreceiving
to simplify the systemmodelby "abstractingaway" process is enabled,OCCAMsemanticspermita receiving
unessentialdetail. Foursuch simplifications,which taken process to starta hardware-timerandto take a default
togetherreduce the size of the state space by manyorders actionif the expectedcommunicationis notreceived
of magnitude,are incorporatedinto figure 4 and beforethe timer"times out." Whenthe externalchannels
described next. arefunctional,these time-out transitions arenever taken.
The logical variableFail1 (Fail2) is used in the guard
of the send1 (send2) channel time-out transitions to
Focus on Process Communication Logic eliminatethe time-outtransitionsfrom the reachability
The process communicationlogic is embeddedin a graph (describedin the next section) when external ,
simple, cyclic PRODUCER-CONSUMER system (fig. 3). channel sendl (send2) is intact. Effectively we enhance
The single transitions, produce in PRODUCER and system behavior visualization by obtaining a projection of
consume in CONSUMER, represent the "other" activities relevant behavior.
.......
PRODUCER
PROD1 (Prl)
(Pr= pr2^ (net Ok1) )_ Ikll)l
_O Pd(_ DECOUPLER 1"(no1 '+ kl)_outl I out1 ? Deld (notFalll)_lendla,¢ I Dold
It exllpar iltatull I TRUE CONSUMER(C)
€on|umel
PROD(Pr) _=.al= _,_produce enterpar
FIll1 "_ 104
exltpar __
PROD2 (Pr2) =_=.me2
(Pr = p12. (not Ok2))_ =kip2
) _oUt2 ! out2 ? 0€1d (notFall2)_ lend2a,° ! Dc2d
pr20_ pl21 S p;_2 dc12_%... de22
exitplr Matul2 I TRUE
L .......
Figure4. Ostroffdiagramlanguagerepresentationof PRODUCER,DECOUPLER1,DECOUPLER2, andCONSUMER
processes.ThePRODUCERprocess is modeled as a composition of concurrentprocesses PROD, PROD1, and PROD2.
Thenameof theActivityvariableforeachprocessisshowninparenthesesfollowingtheprocessname.Theinitialvalue
of theActivityvariableforeachprocessisindicatedby an arrow(_). Theinitialvalueforall datavariables(Pd,Dcld,
Dc2d, Cd) is zero. The transitionlabeled exitpar, which occurs in PROD, PROD1, and PROD2, is an example of an
interactiontransition.Theinteractionexitpar is enabledwhenPr =pr2, Prl = pr12,andPr2= pr22.If exitpar is taken,the
processes PROD, PROD1, and PROD2 progress simultaneously. The transitionlabelsendla, c means there are two
transitions(sendla, send1) connectingthenodes.
Simplify Hardware-Timer Details specification. A system satisfies a specification if all
possible behaviors satisfy the specification. We present
Because here we verifyonly qualitative temporal logic results for two cases--the Normal Operation case and the
specifications, the upper time bound on transitionsthat External Channel Failure case.
model hardware-timers are set to unity when verifying
response properties.
Normal Operation Case Results
Verification Procedures and Results In normaloperationof the transputernetworkmodeled by
figure 4, both external channels between transputers are
For finite-state systems, the Framework provides software functional. The reachability graph of the system for this
which uses the component process models to compute a case was manually diagrammed and is shown as figure 5.
system reachability graph and decision procedures which
use the graph structure in evaluating the validity of The diagram is relatively simple because process model
certain system specifications. A reachability graph is a details irrelevant to verification of fault-tolerant com-
list of vertices and a list of edges connecting vertices that munication have been abstracted away as described
summarize possible system behavior. Graph vertices earlier. In this section, we rely heavily on this diagram
represent system states, and graph edges represent in order to emphasize the usefulness of this system-
transitions which change system state. A behavior of the behavior-visualization aid. For conciseness we refer to a
system is a path (a sequence of states) in the reachability diagram of a reachability graph as a Graph.
graph which starts at a state satisfying an initial condition
T 0
TransitionLabel Abbreviations pr/
pr: produce ] 1
en: enteqoar [
ex: exitpar en
sla: sendla ._
s2a send2a
c c t
s2c:: send2c " out1 out2
st1: status1 J "'',,_ 4
st,?.: status2cl: consume1
c2: consume2 $1a out2 out1 s2a
st1 out2 sla s2a out1 st2
-I'
s2c _ st2 "cl c2 / st1 _ st2....= sl,c
,e_ ---_- _c "_'-,,_-c2 _ st2 _"-_ ,,st2 _stl .:><...j.>< _ _ ._- s_l
21ex _cl _ "st2 . st1 _c2 f- ex
pr _cl -- ex _c2 _ pr
out2 _ _cl c2_ out1- o,ut2
I out1 _ = _ 34 J
"_outl out2 _cl __ j-C2 F 0lut2"outl_"
cl C2
Figure5. ReachabilityGraph,NormalOperationCase.Asdescribedin thetextthis Graphis a projectionof system
behaviorin thatTimertransitions(nevertakenin NormalOperation)aresuppressedinorderto enhancesystembehavior
visualization.In orderto eliminateclutterresultingfromlonglinesconnectingvertices,somenodesare repeated.
Repeatedverticesarecircled.Thevertexnumberuniquelyidentifiesthe vertex.
Important system characteristics are evident in figure 5: SS Following a produce transition, a consume transition
The system is symmetric. The symmetry of the Graph precedes the next produce transition.
reflects the symmetry in the component processes with Specification $5 implies that data are consumed in the
, regard to use of the communication channels between order produced. However, the Graph clearly shows that
processes. (During a modeling effort, absence of expected specification $5 is unnecessarily restrictive (reference
symmetry or regularity is often a clear indication of a node 25). That specification would also be impossible to
modeling error.) implement (without compromising the fault-tolerance
objective) because the PRODUCER process has no
The system is nondeterministic. Many states may be information with regard to the status of the CONSUMER
exited by several transitionsmany one of which can be process. In the next section, the decision procedures are
chosen in a particular cycle. Transitions from the applied to verify similar properties.
component processes interleave, indicating the coopera-
tion among the processes to transfer data. Unanticipated
interleaving often results in undesirable system behavior. External Channel Failure Case
When, as in this case, the reachability graph is relatively We begin with a brief review of the Framework
simple, certain system specifications can be verified by specification language and decision procedures. The
visual inspection of the Graph. The relevant specifications Framework specification language is a Temporal Logic in
are determined by considering what can go wrong. The which many important reactive system properties can be
fact that communication is synchronous introduces the expressed. Temporal logic specifications are interpreted
possibility of deadlock if process communication logic is over system behaviors (i.e., sequences of reachable states)
flawed. The fact that all data are sent via two autonomous which are Summarized by a system reachability graph. A
decoupler processes introduces the possibility that data system satisfies a temporal logic specification if all
may arrive at the CONSUMER process "out of order." possible behaviors satisfy the specification. Discussion of
(In the following paragraphs, the symbols Sl, S2, etc., are temporal logic is beyond the scope of this report; instead,
specification labels.) we include (necessarily) imprecise English language
interpretations of the temporal logic expressions used. We
Inspection of figure 5 will confirm that: next review the three classes (safety, precedence, and
Sl The system does not deadlock-- response) of Temporal Logic specifications that we
will need.
because every state has exiting transitions.
A safety specification is conventionally expressed in the
S2 All data produced are sent over both external form
channels in the order produced-- $6 V1 -'_[] V2
because following each produce transition, both sendl
and send2 transitions precede the next produce read: if _l, then henceforth _t2 where _1 and _2 are
transition, state-formulas.
S3 All data are consumed in the order sent-- A system satisfies this specification if _/2 is TRUE for all
states following any state for which _1 is TRUE.
because following transmission of data over both channel
send1 and send2, a consume transition precedes the next Specifications involving temporal ordering of transitions
occurrence of a send1 or send2 transition, can be expressed using the temporal operator P
(precedes) asin
Together $2 and $3 imply that although the data are
transmitted via two autonomous decoupler processesu S7 V1 ''> _2 P V3
read: if _I, then _2 precedes _3 where _1, U2,,and V3
S4 All data produced are consumed in the order produced, are state-formulas. A system satisfies this specification if
following any state in which V1 is TR_a state in
The insight provided by the Graph is also very important which _2 is TRUE precedes a state in which _3 is
when attempting to write formal specifications in prep- TRUE.
aration for using the Framework decision procedures.
An "obvious" specification for temporal-ordering of the
data is:
A response specification is of the form As noted earlier, a system is said to be deadlocked if it is
S8 _1 "-'>0 q/2 in a state in which no transition (other than the clock
transition) is enabled. The system was verified to be
read: if _1, then eventually _2 where _1 and _2 are state- deadlock-free by invoking the safety decision procedure
formulas, to verify "
A system satisfies this specification if following any state S11 initial --€[] ((enabled '_)and ('__ Tick))
in which q/1 is TRUE--a state in which _2 is TRUE is i.e., following a state which satisfies the initial condition
eventually reached, specification, some transition (other than the clock
The Framework provides decision procedures for safety, transition) is enabled in every reachable state.
precedence, and response class specifications. The Using the precedence decision procedure, we verified
decision procedures use a system reachability graph,
which summarizes possible system behavior, in eval- S12
uating specification validity. When a decision procedure after_produce -€ (Next = send2) P (Next = produce)
for a class of specifications is invoked to verify a i.e., after a transition which produces data, the data are
specification of the class, the decision procedure always sent before more data are produced (Next is the next-
terminates and either confirms the specification validity transition-taken variable)
or provides information regarding the state(s) and
transition(s) which violate the specification, and
In the following paragraphs, we apply the specification $13
language and decision procedures to verify that fault- after_send2 --_ (Next = CONSUME) P (Next = send2)
tolerant communication between transputers is achieved, i.e., after a transition which sends data, those data are
Specifically, we verify that after failure of an external consumed before more data are sent.
channel between transputers: Using the response decision procedure, we verified
S9 The system does not deadlock. S14 after_produce --> 0 after_consume
S10 All data are transferred between transputers in the
correct temporal order, i.e., all data produced are eventually consumed. The
upper time bound for all transitions was set to unity in
The variables Faill and Fail2 provide a convenient way computing the more-complex reachability graph (not
to introduce an external channel failure. Referring to shown) used to verify S14.
figure 4, when Faill is assigned the value TRUE, the
DECOUPLER 1:send1 transition is disabled which Validity of specifications $11, S12, $13, and S14 implies
effectively models channel sendl failure. The Graph (i.e., that fault-tolerant communication between transputers is
the diagram of the reachability graph) for this case is achieved. After failure of an external channel between
shown as figure 6. transputers--the system does not deadlock and all data
are transferred between transputers in the correct
The Graph includes both the "transient" system behavior temporal order.
in the cycle immediately following external-channel
sendl failure and the behavior in the cycles thereafter.
We next express the informal specifications $9 and $10
in terms of safety, precedence, and response class
specifications and then invoke the appropriate decision
procedure to check specification validity.
0 TransitionLabelAbbreviations/
pr pr produce
I en enterpar
T ex exitpar
T 1 s2a send2ast2 status2
en skl skip1
._ c2 consume2
to1
to4
out1 out2 out1
,_ out2
to1 out2 out1 s2a
to.
12 _r_ 13 _1' -- 14"_J 15_m TM _ 13
e[x_-'to4 s_-c;' _ t°l_ 1_ _st2 out1
. • _tol _- _'c2_ = __ ,,
26_t°4_ :C2_ t°l_
en_to4 P_c2 e]x
out2 c2,_r
33 J 32 34 35
skl ,_nto,38 ' 36 39
."c2 .-.,,_t.o:4 out2" _ out2 skl
st2 to4
17(_ 1°4_it2 _(_'18 c_sk146
skl
Figure 6. Reachability Graph, External Channel (send1) Failure Case. This Graph is a projectionof system behavior in
that send2 channel timer transitions are suppressed in order to enhance system behavior visualization. In order to
eliminate clutter resulting from long lines connecting vertices, some vertices are repeated. Repeated vertices are circled.
The vertex number uniquely identifies the vertex.
9
Concluding Remarks 3. Alur, R.; and Henzinger, T. A.: Logics and Models of
RealTime: A Survey. In REX Workshop--Real
In thepreceding,using the Ostroffframeworkforreactive Time:Theory in Practice,LNCS. Springer-
systemverification,an approachto achievingfault- Verlag, 1992.
tolerant communication between transputers was shown .*
to be effective. The key components of the design, the 4. Ostroff, J. S.: Temporal Logic for Real-Time
decoupler processes, may be viewed as discrete-event- Systems. Advanced Software Development
controllers introduced to constrain system behavior such Series. Research Studies Press Limited )
that system specifications are satisfied. (distributed by John Wiley and Sons), England,
1989.
The Ostroff framework was also effective. The expres-
siveness of the modeling language permitted construction 5. INMOS staff. Communicating Process Architecture.
of a faithful model of the transputer network. The relevant Prentice Hall, 1988.
specifications were readily expressed in the specification 6. Barnes, D. P.; Downes, C. G.; and Gray, J. O.: The
language. The set of decision procedures provided was Real Time Control of a Hexapodal Robot Using
adequate to verify the specifications of interest (although Multiple Transputers. In Proceedings of the
decision procedures to verifymore general classes of Third International Conference on Applications
temporal logic specifications will often be useful or of Transputers. IOS Press, 1991.
necessary).
7. Lawes, S. T.; Clarke, T.; and Taylor, P.: Transputer
However, the Ostroff framework and other current Based Real-Time Simulation of Helicopter
generation frameworks for reactive system verification Dynamics for Advanced Flight Control
are particularly weak in one very important dimension, Applications. In Proceedings of the Third
namely, support for system behavior visualization. (The International Conference on Applications of
importance of system behavior visualization during the Transputers. lOS Press, 1991.
verification process was emphasized in the section
discussing Normal Operation Case results.) "Inability to 8. Mandal, M.; Garg, H. K.; Matieda, I, C.; Mishra, A.;
visualize system behavior" is a factor restricting current Basu, S. K.; Majumder, K. L.; Udpikar, V.; and
applications to small, safety-critical portions of complex Kaushal, A,: Implementation of Synthetic
systems. As a first step, software tools enabling one to Aperture Radar Processor on a Transputer Based
interactively construct, to browse, and to compare Parallel Machine. In Proceedings of the Third
reachability-graph diagrams are needed. Manual con- International Conference on Applications of
struction of these basic visualization aids is an extremely Transputers. IOS Press, 1991.
tedious task. There is great opportunity for innovation 9. Galletly, J.: OCCAM 2. Pitman Publishing, 1990.
with regard to system behavior visualization tools. For
example, in a related context, an approach wherein 10. Gennart, B. A.; and Luckham, D. C.: Validating
sequences of transitions are mapped into higher-level Discrete Event Simulations Using Event Pattern
transitions improved behavior visualization (ref. 10). The Mappings. In Proceedings 29th ACM/IEEE
surveys by Ostroff (ref. 11),Alur and Henzinger (ref. 3), Design Automation Conference. IEEE Computer
and Scholfield (ref. 12)describe the vigorous, current Society Press, 1992.
research effort that is directed at developing more 11. Ostroff, J. S.: Formal Methods for the Specification
powerful frameworks for reactive system verification, and Design of Real-Time Safety Critical
Systems. Journal of Systems and Software, April
References 1992.
1. Manna,Z.; andWaldinger,R.: Logical Basis for 12. Scholfield, D. J.:The FormalDevelopmentof Real-
ComputerProgramming.Addison-Wesley,1989. time Systems.Technical Report, Dept. ofComputerScience, Universityof York, England,
2. Manna, Z.; andPnueli, A.: The TemporalLogic of 1990. _,
Reactive and Concurrent Systems. Springer-
Vedag, 1991.
10

FormApprovedREPORT DOCUMENTATIONPAGE oMBNo7o4-o 88
Public reportingburden for this collectionof informationis estimated to average 1 hour per response, includingthe time for reviewinginstructions,searchingexisting data sources,
gathering and maintainingthe data needed, and completingand reviewingthe collection of information. Send comments regardingthis burdenestimate or any other aspect of this
collectionof information, includingsuggestionsfor reducingthis burden, to WashingtonHeadquarters Services, Directoratefor InformationOperations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson
Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington,VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Managementand Budget,Paperwork ReductionProject (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
September 1993 Technical Memorandum
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS
Reactive System Verification Case Study--Fault-Tolerant Transputer
Communication
6. AUTHOR(S) 505-64-52 l
D. FrancisCraneandPhilipJ. Hamory
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
REPORT NUMBER
Ames Research Center
Moffett Field, CA 94035-1000 A-93103
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING
AGENCY REPORT NUMBER
NationalAeronauticsand SpaceAdministration
•, ,,_ _as";n_'*on,DC 20546-0001 NASA TM- 108784
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
Point of Contact: D. Francis Crane, Ames Research Center, MS 210-3, Moffett Field, CA 94035-1000
(415) 604-1434
12a. DISTRIBUTIONIAVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE
Unclassified -- Unlimited
Subject Category 61
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)
A reactive program is one which engages in an ongoing interaction with its environment. A system which is controlled by an
embedded reactive program is called a reactive system. Examples of reactive systems are aircraft flight management systems, bank
automatic teller machine (ATM)networks, airline reservation systems and computer operating systems. Reactive systems are often
naturally modeled (for logical design purposes) as a composition of autonomous processes which progress concurrently and which
communicate to share information and/or to coordinate activities.
Formal (i.e., mathematical) frameworks for system verification are tools used to increase the users' confidence that a system
design satisfies its specification. A framework for reactive system verification includes formal languages for system modeling and for
behavior specification and decision procedures and/or proof-systems for verifying that the system model satisfies the system
specifications.
In the study reported here, using the Ostroff framework for reactive system verification, an approach to achieving fault-tolerant
communication between transputers was shown to be effective. The key components of the design, the decoupler processes, may be
viewed as discrete-event-controllers introduced to constrain system behavior such that system specifications are satisfied.
The Ostroff framework was also effective. The expressiveness of the modeling language permitted construction of a faithful
model of the transputer network. The relevant specifications were readily expressed in the specification language. The set of decision
procedures provided was adequate to verify the specifications of interest.
The need for improved support for system behavior visualization isemphasized.
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